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Abstract
We build a general equilibrium model of bank competition in which securitization
is the banksoptimal choice. A symmetric capacity-constrained Bertrand competition
equilibrium exists as in the directed search literature, e.g. Burdett, Shi and Wright
(2001). A key feature of the model is that banks face heterogeneous projects and they
can use their lending rate as a tool to compete for good projects. The competition of
banks lowers the lending rate, which in turn results in a low deposit rate. Consequently,
a low level of credit supply coexists with some uninvested high-return projects. The
shortage of credit supply resulting from bank competition naturally motivates banks to
sell their assets through securities in order to raise more funds to invest in the projects
being rationed.
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1 Introduction
Securitization is the nancial practice of pooling mortgages, bank loans, credit-card debts,
and other nancial assets into securities that are then sold to investors. As a nancial
innovation securitization appeared in the late 1970s, and its volume has experienced a rapid
expansion thereafter, especially during the 2000s. In 2006 the outstanding securitized assets
by nancial intermediaries in U.S. amount to more than 2.5 trillion US dollars (Du¢ e, 2007).
This rapidly increasing volume of securitization raises two questions: what is the incentive
to securitize and what are the consequences of the surge in this practice?
These questions have been broadly discussed. First, securitization activity is closely
related to "credit risk transfer" (Gordon and Pennacchi, 1995; Calstrom and Samolyk, 1992,
1993; Allen and Carletti, 2006). However, securitization fails to achieve in practice what is
sought in theory: it fails to shift the burden of defaults on securitized assets from nancial
institutions to nal investors. Alan Greenspan stated that "(securitization can) spread risk
over a broader spectrum of nancial markets". The similar argument that securitization
leads to risk sharing is also supported in Allen and Gale (2005), Wagner and March (2006),
etc.. But recent evidence tends to show that securitization actually increases nancial risk
to the originators of securities (Purnanandam, 2009; Keys et al., 2010; Greenlaw et al., 2008;
Gordon, 2008; Berndt and Gupta, 2009; Michalak and Uhde, 2009). The evidence does not
support risk-sharing as the rst motive of securitization. Instead, using US bank holding
company data from 2001 to 2007, Sarkisyan et al. (2009) draw the conclusion that banks
view securitization as a nancing mechanism rather than a risk management one.
Another theory of bank loan sales appeals to regulatory constraints as the motivation
for this o¤-balance-sheet activity (Pennacchi, 1988; Du¤ee and Zhou, 2001; Calomiris and
Mason, 2004). Asset sales may allow a bank to avoid "regulatory taxes," i.e., to meet
capital requirements. The evolution of capital requirement regulation could have encouraged
securitization, but the timing of the Basel Accords are not consistent with the timing of the
securitization boom. An international rule on banks lending activities, the 1988 Basel
I Accord species that banks are required to hold capital no less than 8% of their risk-
weighted assets. The 2004 Basel II Accord elaborated the rules of capital requirement. The
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U.S. adopted the Basel II Accord in 2005, but the most dramatic increase of the volume of
securitization was already taking place in the early 2000s. Moreover, although the empirical
evidence shows that regulatory taxes have an important impact on loan sales, it also shows
that there are more important factors a¤ecting loan sales, such as a banks comparative
advantage in originating loans (Pavel and Phillis, 1987; Demsetz, 2000).
A third theory to explain the rise in securitization has to do with recycling bank funds:
more loan originating opportunities for a bank may motivate the bank to securitize its assets
in order to raise funds to invest in the available good projects (Gordon and Pennacchi,
1995; Parlour and Plantin, 2008). This theory is supported by empirical evidence. Demsetz
(2000), for instance, nds that banks with ample loan origination opportunities are more
likely to sell loans. However, rare papers have paid attension to what might have caused
the increased loan originating opportunities during the period when securitization booms.
To our knowledge, the existing models did not endogenize the loan originating opportunity
of banks. We propose that erier bank competition might have distorted the loan market,
generating excess demand for credit.
That the bank competition may cause excess demand for credit is not a new idea and it is
supported by both theory and empirical evidence. Petersen and Rajan (1995) nd that it is
easier for rms to get funding in a concentrated nancial market than in a more competitive
nancial markets. It means that bank competition does not make borrowing easier, as one
might be inclined to think, but it actually makes it harder to get loans. So wherever the
lending market is more competitive, there may be excess demand for credit.
There is increasing evidence showing that competition among nancial intermediaries
has become ercer during the period when the scale of securitization surged. This is due to
nancial liberalization and deregulation. The quarterly Senior Loan O¢ cer Opinion Survey
(1997-2011) on bank lending practices, released by the board of governors of the Federal
Reserve System, states that almost all domestic and foreign respondents (from investment
and commercial banks, as well as other nancial intermediaries) cited more aggressive com-
petition from other banks or non-bank lenders as the most important reason for easing their
lending standards and terms. The survey also revealed that 50% of those responding be-
lieved that increased competitive pressure reected a permanent shift in the loan market.
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More than 20% of banks have reported eased lending standards for Commercial and In-
dustrial loans, and around 50% of banks have reported decreasing spreads on loan pricing.
There are also some papers that document the increased competition in the nancial sec-
tor. For example, DellArrica et. al. (2008) nd that lending standards declined more in
areas that experienced large credit booms and that kept a higher volume of securitization,
and that this change was triggered by the entry of new and large lenders. A few papers
(Boot and Schmeits, 2006; Hakenes and Schnabel, 2010, HS thereafter; Ahn and Breton,
2010, AB thereafter; Ahn, 2010) also remark that interbank competition has been increased
dramatically.
We build a dynamic general equilibrium model of bank competition to show that bank
competition could lead to excess demand for credit and motivate securitization. A key
feature of the model is that banks face heterogenous projects and they can use lending rate
as a tool to compete for good projects. Under the commonly applied capital requirement
rules, the equilibrium features capacity-constrained Bertrand competition. The competition
among banks makes them face a trade-o¤ between lending rate and number of borrowers.
Competition induces a low lending rate, and therefore a low deposit rate, which in turn
restricts the aggregate amount of credit supply. As a consequence, some protable projects
will be rationed, which motivates nancial intermediaries to innovate in order to extend the
size of their protable investment. Securitization is such an innovation. Consistent with the
nancial liberalization during the securitization boom, we make two key assumptions in the
model capital requirement and free lending rate.
Our baseline bank competition framework could be considered as one application of
the capacity-constrained Bertrand competition (or directed search) as in Peters (1984) and
Burdett, Shi and Wright (2001, BSW thereafter). As shown in Peters (1984) and BSW,
there is always a unique symmetric mixed strategy equilibrium, where all the sellers (banks
in our model) post an identical price that is lower than the monopolistic price and higher
than the perfect competitive price, and all the buyers (entrepreneurs in our model) choose
an identical mixed strategy (a probability prole) on which seller to attend.1
1Besides a symmetric mixed strategy equilibrium, there could be other equilibria. For example, there
could be an equilibrium of price dispersion (Arnold, 2000; Shi, 2009). We will assume that the banks can
commit to the contracts that they post. If banks could renegotiate the terms of contract after they met,
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Our model is most closely related to a few recent papers that paid attention to two ignored
factors in the previous theory. First, bank competition could be a motive for asset sales (HS,
2010; AB, 2010; Ahn, 2010). Second, securitization could be motivated by endogenous credit
supply (Shin, 2009). The theoretical models related to the incentive for securitization are
mostly partial equilibrium analysis, while Shin (2009) advanced the focus to endogenous
credit supply.
Besides the important di¤erence in endogeneity of credit supply between our model and
HS (2010), AB (2010) and Ahn (2010), we also explore a di¤erent mechanism and deliver
di¤erent welfare and risk implications. In terms of mechanism, HS uses a Salop spatial com-
petition (Salop, 1979), and AB uses a two period duopoly competition model with switching
cost (as in Gehrig and Stenbacka, 2007), while we use a capacity-constrained Bertrand com-
petition (Kreps and Scheinkman 1983, and Peters 1984). Ahn (2010) focuses on a special
form of loan sales  - the single name loan sales, rather than securitization. The entre-
preneurs in HS face a trade-o¤ between interest rate and distance, and those in AB face a
trade-o¤between interest rate and switching cost. In our model they face a trade-o¤between
interest rate and probability of being nanced. The trade-o¤ in our model arises because
bankslending capacity is restricted by the endogenous supply of funding. The probability
of being nanced depends on the loan market tightness (the number of borrowers relative
to the number of lenders). While the switching cost in AB and the "iceberg" cost in HS
are reasonable, their roles in the bank competition diminish as the information technology
(including electronic banking) advances and transportation becomes less costly.
The consequences of securitization in our model are di¤erent than in ABs model. AB
nds that the equilibrium without monitoring, caused by securitization, brings higher prot
to the banks and leads to a worse quality of invested projects, which reduces the welfare. In
our model, bank competition restricts credit supply, while securitization increases it. In the
equilibrium, output, bank prots, and welfare are higher, but the quality of invested projects
is lower. Therefore, securitization increases both welfare and aggregate risk in our model.
their could also be price dispersion (see Camera and Selcuk, 2009). Moreover, we allow an entrepreneur
to meet only with one bank, rather than having multiple meetings, although the later may be also very
interesting. For reference, Albrecht, Gautier and Vroman (2006) have explored a directed search equilibrium
with multiple job applications.
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Securitization can cause a higher risk for an economy, but it is not fair to judge securi-
tization by this higher risk alone. If the banks are e¤ective in selecting good projects, the
best projects should have been invested rst, leaving those of lower quality in general. The
extended lending through funds raised from securitization should be subprime loans. These
loans increase the aggregate risk of default in an economy. While this increase in aggregate
risk caused by securitization is easy to predict, it is often confused with "risk transfer" as-
sociated with securitization. Securitized assets are often repackaged and split into tranches.
Each tranche has a di¤erent level of risk exposure: there is generally a senior (A) class of
securities and one or more junior subordinated (B,C,etc.) classes. The senior classes
have rst claim on the cash that the Special Purpose Vehicle (SPV) receives, while the more
junior classes only start receiving repayment after the more senior classes have been repaid.
After the assets are repackeged, the nal investors have the choice of their favorable assets.
For example, highly risk-averse investors may favor AAA rated securities rather than a pri-
vate car loan, while some risk-loving investors may be attracted to a high interest and choose
a B or C class of securities. If the securities are priced reasonably, the transfer of risk does
not a¤ect the aggregate risk of assets, but it only inuences the distribution of risk across
di¤erent investors.
In addition, when we try to interpret the consequences of securitization, the question
is not whether securitization leads to higher default risks, but whether those projects with
higher risks should be invested or not. If those projects with higher risks should be invested,
the consequence is a higher risk (which will be compensated by the return), no matter
whether the projects are funded by selling loans or in any other ways. Murray (2001)
makes a similar case, pointing out that we should determine if there are risks unique to
securitization as distinct from risks related to changes in overall market conditions. To get
such a comprehensive understanding of the consequences of securitization, we should use a
general equilibrium model.
It is also very important to understand how to price securities with di¤erent levels of
risks. However, in the current paper we do not model risk management by a bank, since
we only focus on the reasons for securitization. It is true that, after selling the assets as
securities, the banks may have also changed the level of risk they face. Sometimes the banks
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may even strategically manage their risk by designing securities. There could also be some
asymmetric information problems in the process of securitization. Inuential works on the
designing of securities include Demarzo and Du¢ e (1999) and Rahi and Du¢ e (1995), among
others. In this paper, we leave out this complication of security pricing. Instead, we simply
assume that the banks sell proportionately their assets of di¤erent levels of risks. We also
assume that the pricing of securitized assets is e¢ cient. So there will be no aggregate risk
generated by the process of securitization. Our focus is on why the economy generates excess
demand for funding, or what causes some protable projects not being invested in the rst
place, which is what creates the needs for banks to raise more money through securitization.
Another contribution of our paper is the construction of a tractable framework with many
banks and a large number of diversied projects. In the model households make optimal
portfolio choices, so the model could be extended to study pricing securities with di¤erent
tranches. The model could be calibrated to data and simulated to analyze macroeconomic
policy.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the model environment;
section 3 gives the optimal decisions of di¤erent agents: the households, the banks, and
the entrepreneurs; section 4 denes and characterizes the equilibrium without securitization;
section 5 denes and characterizes the equilibrium with securitization; section 6 gives an
example, and section 7 concludes.
2 Environment
Time is innite in the forward direction and is divided into discrete periods indexed by t;
t = 0; 1; 2; 3; :::. The economy consists ofB ( 2) islands indexed by i; i = 1; 2; 3; :::B. In each
island, there is one bank. A bank may operate for multiple periods until it defaults. There
are overlapping generations of two-period lived households (and an initial "old" generation
in period zero). Each generation has a unit measure. A representative young household is
endowed with one unit of labor, which is supplied inelastically to produce a canned good.
The representative young household consumes a part of its labor income and saves the rest
for consumption when it becomes old. The canned good can be saved either by a storage
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technology or through deposit at a bank. A household has access to all the banks. A bank can
lend the deposit to entrepreneurs. There is also a large number N (>> B) of entrepreneurs,
each of them endowed with a one-period project in every period t; t = 1; 2; 3; :::. A project
takes the canned good as input and produces an intermediate good as output. We assume
that the old households own the entrepreneurs in the sense that they get all the prots from
the entrepreneursprojects.
The canned good is produced by a constant returns to scale technology using intermediate
good and labor. Since the labor supply is xed, we may write the production function in
per young-household terms. For any period t, the production function of the canned good
yt is yt = ztf(mt 1); where mt 1 is the amount of intermediate good per young household
(the production of m will be dened later) and zt is an aggregate productivity shock. We
take the random variable zt to be i.i.d. over time, to be distributed continuously over a nite
positive support, and to have a mean equal to ~z: The canned good can be consumed, stored,
or invested in intermediate good production.
One unit of the canned good in period t can still be one unit of the canned good in period
t + 1 through a storage technology. The canned good in period t can also be transformed
into period t + 1 intermediate good (without the use of labor) by means of an investment
technology. This investment technology comes in discrete, indivisible units, called "projects".
Each entrepreneur is endowed with one of these projects (and we assume that it is too costly
to trade or transfer a project away from the original owner). A project takes exactly x units
of the canned good as input:With less than x units of the canned good, nothing is produced,
and the marginal product of increments of the canned good to a project that already has its
requisite quantity of input is zero.
Any project that is undertaken in period t produces a quantity of intermediate good
available for use in period t + 1. The amount of intermediate good produced by a given
project is a discrete random variable with possible outcomes j; j = 1; 2. We focus on the
case of only two outcomes: a good outcome 1 = 1 with probability ; and a bad outcome
2 = 0 with probability 1   : The entrepreneurs type  obeys an i.i.d distribution with a
Cumulative Distribution Function (CDF) G() and a Probability Density Function (PDF)
g() on the support of

; 

with 0 <  <   1: The intermediate good cannot be consumed
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but it can be used in the production of the canned good. The intermediate good is assumed
to depreciate fully in one period (this is for an expositional reason only).
Although the entrepreneurs are endowed with the intermediate good production technol-
ogy, they do not have the canned good as input in the production. So the entrepreneurs need
to borrow from the banks. Banks are assumed to have the expertise to screen and monitor
entrepreneurs, since the later may falsely report their type if there is no screening and hide
the intermediate good if there is no monitoring. But, for simplicity, we assume that the
banks can screen and monitor the entrepreneurs with zero cost, while the households cannot
screen and monitor the entrepreneurs.
Besides their traditional intermediation function as delegated monitors (Diamond, 1984),
banks are also assumed to have a new function: originate-to-distribute (O&D) (including
securitization). The banksnew business of securitization is to fully exploit their special
expertise of analyzing the credit worthiness of borrowers. That is, the banks originate a
larger pool of loans and resell some of their loans to other investors. In order to avoid banks
moral hazard problem of investing in bad projects and reselling them to other investors, the
banks are often required to keep a proportion of their securities. This is usually called "skin
in the game".
An authority (central bank) is assumed to regulate the banksbehavior. First, the central
bank sets a capital requirement for loans. That is, for a certain amount of loan, k (1 > k  0)
proportion of it has to be nanced by banks capital, and only 1  k proportion of it could
be nanced by householdsdeposit. Second, if a bank securitizes its assets, the bank has to
hold at least  proportion of the securities (the original assets).
In each period, given the central banks regulation, the banks make an investment plan.
According to their plan, they choose a quantity of bank capital Ki. Given Ki; the banks
raise deposit in a competitive market. All the banks take deposit rate r as given, the total
volume of deposit that the bank i will get, Si(r), has to satisfy Si(r)= [Ki + Si(r)]  1  k:
We assume that the depositors have full insurance, so the volume of deposits depends only
on the interest rate, and it does not depend on any risk.
After the funds have been raised, the bank lends them to entrepreneurs. The procedure
of applying for funds is as follows. (1) The banks post their loan contract conditions, which
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are observable to other banks and to all the entrepreneurs. (2) Given the posted contracts,
every entrepreneur chooses a strategy (a probability prole) on which island to attend. This
strategy is a public information. (3) Every entrepreneur visits an island to apply for funds.
(4) The banks evaluate the risk of each project that comes to their own island and discover
the quality of the project, . The quality of a project  is a common information in the island
where the project is evaluated, but other banks do not know it. (5) The banks decide which
entrepreneurs to nance. (6) The entrepreneurs stay in the island: the ones that have been
nanced produce the intermediate goods, while the ones that have no funding do nothing but
stay in the island. Some of the entrepreneurs who have relatively good quality may have the
chance to be invested later if the banks could raise more money through securitization. Note
that, during the period, the entrepreneurs cannot move to other islands (or be evaluated by
other banks).
After the banks have invested in their selected projects, they can resell a proportion of
their loans to the young households as securities. Let  denote the average success probability
of the securities in the market. The security will entail a return ra with probability . Both
the banks and the households will take the contract of securities (ra; ) as given. The total
volume of securities from bank i is denoted by Sai (r
a; ): If r < 1; then the representative
young household stores all the canned goods that it will save for consumption when old. We
denote the storage by s: The banks can use the funds from selling the securities to invest
in new projects. All these invested projects produce the intermediate goods, which will be
available for the next period.
3 Optimal Decisions
3.1 Households
A representative young household in period t supplies 1 unit of labor inelastically and earns
wage income wt: It consumes c
y
t  0 and saves the rest through the following means: deposit
at a bank i; Si;t  0; securities from a bank i; Sai;t  0; for all i = 1; 2; :::; B; and storage,
st  0: The saving decisions are made according to the interest rate of the deposit, rt; and
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the interest rate of the securities, rat ; together with the average probability of getting the
returns of the securities, t:
A representative old household owns the entrepreneurs who produce the intermediate
goods and takes all their prot. The old household passes the ownership of the entrepreneurs
to the next generation when it dies. The expected prot of entrepreneurs is denoted by ~e;t+1.
This prot from entrepreneurs and the savings of the representative household will all be
used to consume when it becomes old. The consumption of the representative old household
in period t+ 1 is cot+1  0:
The representative young households maximization problem is
maxU(cyt ) + EU
 
cot+1

subject to the following budget constraints
cyt +
BX
i=1
Si;t +
BX
i=1
Sai;t + st = wt; and c
o
t+1 = rt
BX
i=1
Si;t + tr
a
t
BX
i=1
Sai;t + st + ~e;t+1: (3.1)
The utility function satises the usual assumptions and the discounting factor satises 0 <
 < 1: We restrict our attention to the case where the deposit at bank i is non-decreasing
in interest rate rt, i.e. Si;t(rt) weakly increases in rt:
3.2 Entrepreneurs
The entrepreneurs make one period decision only, so we omit the subscript t: After observing
the loan contract conditions, the entrepreneurs choose a strategy on which island to attend.
The contract conditions are described by
n
i;
~i (ni)
oB
i=1
; where i is the banks share of
the produced intermediate good by the project, and ~i is a threshold value of project quality
 above which the project will be nanced: As in Peters (1984), for simplicity, we let i not
contingent on the number of visitors. However, the selection criterion ~i will depend on the
number of visitors. If the number of visitors is large, ~i is going to be large given the banks
xed lending capacity. We also assume that the banks can commit their i; so we do not
consider the possible bargaining after the banks meet with the entrepreneurs as in Camera
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and Selcuk (2009). Also note that the banks prot is contingent on the realization of the
project, but it does not depend on the evaluated quality  of a project. This contingence
means that a bank i will get a positive prot (in a i proportion) from the project if and
only if the project succeeds.
After an entrepreneur has arrived at its chosen island, it draws a success probability 
from the distribution G(): The information of  is unknown to anybody. The bank needs
to evaluate the project in order to discover the value of : For simplicity, we ignore any
cost associated with evaluation, except that the banks can evaluate all the projects only
once in any one period. After the banks evaluation,  is known to both the bank and
the entrepreneur, but it is still a sealed information for other banks. So we shut down the
incentive for entrepreneurs to move to other islands once they are evaluated by a bank,
since they have lost the opportunity to be evaluated by other banks in the same period.2
According to the revealed ; the bank decides whether to lend funds to the entrepreneur.
All the entrepreneurs bear limited liability, i.e., an entrepreneur pays back to the bank at
most the amount i if state i is realized. With limited liability, an entrepreneur always has
a positive expected return if it invests in its project, so it will always be willing to borrow
from the bank.
If an entrepreneur goes to island i; it faces a contract
n
i;
~i (ni)
o
: An entrepreneur
can expect to be nanced with probability pi = 1   G(~i (ni)): Let i =
R 
~i(ni)
dG()
1 G(~i(ni)) be the
expected average probability of success, the expected prot of an entrepreneur that chooses
island i is
e;i = piq^(1  i)i; (3.2)
where q^ is the expected price of the intermediate good in the next period.
The conditional contract value ~i (ni) depends not only on ni; but also implicitly on both
the protability of the projects and the available funding (Ki + Si) at the bank i. First, if
the expected price of the intermediate goods q^ is high, or/and the marginal cost of funding,
denoted by  (to be dened later); is low, then the projects are more protable for the
2This assumption of entrepreneurs being locked to an island during one period does not a¤ect the general
results, but it makes the model much simplier. This assumption leads to that banks cannot compete for
clients in the securitization stage. This lack of competition in the securitization stage a¤ects only the
magnitude of selling loans, but not the motive for selling loans.
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bank. If the projects are more protable in general, then a project with a lower  might be
worth investing. We dene ^i as the lower bound of project quality, above which projects
are protable. Then ^i is determined by
x = q^^ii: (3.3)
To satisfy the protability condition, we should have the selection criterion ~i  ^i =
x= (q^i) :
Second, the conditional contract value ~i also depends on the potential number of projects
attracted to island i and the available funding at bank i; Di = Ki + Si: Let ni be the total
number of entrepreneurs that came to island i. Given any Di and ni; there is a ~i that
satises (3.4),
nix
h
1 G(~i)
i
= Di: (3.4)
We denote ~i as a function (Di; ni): The value of (Di; ni) decreases in Di, 1(Di; ni) < 0;
and increases in ni, 2(Di; ni) > 0: If ~i > ^i, then Di is not su¢ cient to support all the
protable projects: As a consequence, bank i selects only the good projects that have   ~i:
The threshold value ~i is therefore determined by ~i = max
n
^i; ~i
o
:
An entrepreneur chooses an island according to maxi fe;ig across all i: Given e;i de-
termined in (3.2), an entrepreneur faces a trade-o¤ between i and ~i: in an island with a
lower i; although the prot share of the entrepreneur, 1   i, is higher, the probability of
being invested, pi; is lower, since the island i with a lower i may attract a larger number
of entrepreneurs (higher ni): Given this trade-o¤, the entrepreneursexpected prots in all
islands should be equal in an equilibrium. Otherwise, if an island j o¤ers lower expected
prot than other islands, the entrepreneurs would choose not to come to this island.
3.3 Banks
We assume that banks are very impatient and risk neutral. A bank is expected utility is
ub = E0
1X
t=0
 tcb;i;t;
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where cb;i;t is the bank is consumption of the canned good in period t: We assume that the
discount factor of a bank, 1=; is much smaller than . This is a simple way to motivate a
high cost of acquiring bank capital: if there is no capital requirement, the bank would rather
consume everything it has, and borrow from the household to invest in its available projects.
If there is capital requirement, the bank must maintain some bank equity. We assume that
every bank is endowed with a large amount of bank equity at period 0, such that the banks
have enough canned good to cover the capital requirement. In the future period, the banks
have to save from their prot to maintain the bank equity.3
With this linear utility function, a banks objective is equivalent to maximizing the
expected present value of its life time prots, which is also called the Franchise value of the
bank. The Franchise value of a bank i in period t is
Vi;t = maxb;i;t + 
 1Et (Vi;t+1) ; (3.5)
where b;i;t is the expected prot of bank i in period t:
Here we do not allow banks to strategically default on the deposits of households. "Strate-
gic default" means that the default plan is made before the aggregate states and the indi-
vidual states are realized. If a bank strategically defaults, it may earn excess prot in the
event of default at the expenses of depositors. Invulnerable default, on the contrary, is due
to bad state and the bank earns zero prot when it defaults. Whether to strategically default
may depend crucially on the default regulation and the capital requirement rate k: If any
strategic default (when banks earn positive prots) will be caught and severely punished,
there will be no strategic default. But if not all the strategic defaults will be caught, some
speculators may take the chance to default strategically (moral hazard). Capital requirement
may reduce the banks incentive of strategic default.
In every period, a bank i makes decisions on its capital, deposit, loan contract, and
security sale, sequentially. We divide every period into four stages accordingly. Without
3In order to avoid the case in which bank industrys total capital (equity) is constrained by the total
previous period prot in the bank sector, we assume that banks can aquire capital from outside with a xed
cost : This assumption does not a¤ect steady state analysis. If we take seriously the constraint of bank
industrys total capital, there might be interesting business cycle dynamics from the bank industry. But that
is out of the scope of the current paper.
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confusion, we omit the subscript t below. In the rst stage, the bank chooses an amount of
capital, Ki; with the xed marginal cost . The banks have to make rational expectation
about the optimal decisions in the following stages, in order to decide how much Ki to hold.
In the second stage, taking the market rate r as given, the bank i raises deposit Si from the
young households, with a constraint k (Si +Ki)  Ki. In the third stage, the bank i posts
the contract
n
i;
~i(ni)
o
and lends the funds to entrepreneurs after entrepreneurs types
are discovered. Those entrepreneurs who receive funding have the top tier projects, which
are projects with quality  on the right tail of the distribution of : If the banks are still
interested in some second tier projects, which are not invested through funding from bank
capital (equity) and deposit (debt), they may look for "out of balance sheet" method to raise
funds. In the fourth stage, the bank i decides how much of its loan should be securitized.
The banks use funding through securities to invest in the second tier projects, which we can
also call "subprime" loans.
We rst consider a case in which banks have not innovated securitization, and leave the
securitization analysis to section 5. We solve the banks problem by backward induction. In
the third stage, the bank i chooses i; given that Ki and Si have been determined. Let b;i
be the bank i0s prot and nipi be the total number of projects that the bank i nances, then
the expected prot is
b;i = max
i
n
q^iinipi   Ki   rSi
o
: (3.6)
The banks will always ensure this expected prot non-negative. However, if ni is a nite
number, then it is possible that, ex post, a bank earns a negative prot. To avoid this
problem of deposit risk, we assume full insurance in the banking sector. Moreover, the rate
of this potential failure of a bank is small if capital requirement k is large.
Let (i) be the total loan the bank i would have if it posts i;
(i) = min
h
ni (i)
h
1 G

^ (i)
i
x; Di
i
: (3.7)
The cut-o¤ value of ; ^i, is determined by the banks prot break-even condition; i..e x =
q^^ii: If the bank increases i; more projects become worth investing for the bank, resulting
in an decrease in ^i; ^
0
i (i)  0: The total number of attracted entrepreneurs, however,
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decreases in i; n
0
i (i) < 0.
4 Symmetric equilibrium without securitization
We rst shut down the technology for securitization and restrict our attention to a stationary
symmetric strong Nash equilibrium where Ki; Si; Di; i; ni; pi and ~i are identical for all
i = 1; 2; :::B; and all the entrepreneurs choose an identical mixed strategy on which banks to
attend. As shown in Peters (1984) and BSW (2001), such a capacity-constrained Bertrand
equilibrium always exists and it is unique.
The aggregate state variables in the economy are the total quantity of the intermediate
good, m; and the aggregate productivity, z; at the beginning of each period. The wage rate
and the price of the intermediate good are determined by these two state variables, that is,
q = zf 0(m) and w = y   qm. Here we have assumed that the output production function
features constant returns to scale.
We are going to compare an equilibrium with only one bank and a symmetric equilibrium
with many banks. In the equilibrium with many banks, the banks can compete with each
other. In this capacity-constrained Bertrand competition with a larger number of entrepre-
neurs N , the number of banks B does not a¤ect the equilibrium, as long as there are more
than two banks and N=B is always very large. By comparing the two equilibria, we show
that the competition across banks lowers the equilibrium lending rate and creates excess
demand for funding.
4.1 One bank equilibrium
If there is only one bank, the bank can earn the highest possible prot by posting  = 1:We
assume that an entrepreneur always invests in its project as long as it receives funds, even
if it earns zero prot. So  = 1 means that the bank gets all the surplus from the invested
projects and the entrepreneurs earn zero prots. In this case, the marginal project ~; above
which all projects will be nanced, satises ~ = ^ = x=q^, where  = (1  k) r + k is the
marginal cost of one unit of funds.
In the equilibrium, the bank lends exactly what it has raised. The bank has no incentive
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to raise more funds than what is needed for its investment, since there is no benet from
additional funding but there is additional cost associated with additional funding. In lemma
1 we can show that this statement is true for both an equilibrium with only one bank and a
symmetric equilibrium with many banks. The proof of lemma 1 is provided in appendix A.
Lemma 1 In a symmetric equilibrium, all the banks raise an amount of funds such that
(i) = ni (i)
h
1 G

^ (i)
i
x = Di:
According to Lemma 1, the funding supply equals the funding demand:
N
h
1 G(^)
i
x = D: (4.1)
Given that ^ = x=q^ and  = (1  k) r + k; the equilibrium condition (4.1) can be written
as
xN f1 G [x ((1  k) r + k) =q^]g = S=(1  k);
which gives a fund-demand function Sd = Sd(r): It is easy to show that Sd0(r) < 0: Together
with the fund-supply function S(r) from the consumers problem, we can solve the equilib-
rium interest rate. Since we assume that S 0(r)  0, a unique r can be solved. So there is a
unique equilibrium with  = 1:
4.2 A symmetric equilibrium with many banks
If there are more than one bank, i.e. B  2; then banks cannot maintain a symmetric
equilibrium with i = 1; for all i = 1; 2; :::; B: If all the banks post i = 1; the equilibrium
outcome is equivalent to that with only a single bank. However, if all the banks post i = 1;
then a bank has an incentive to deviate from it. If a bank i decreases its i a little bit, so
that i < 1 and j = 1 for all j 6= i; an entrepreneur can expect a positive prot from visiting
bank i, since (1  i)  > 0: As a consequence, all the entrepreneurs would be attracted to
the deviating island i. If all the entrepreneurs come to island i; the bank i can select better
projects than before the deviation. Let ~di be the project selection criterion by the bank i,
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let ~ be the project selection criterion if all the banks post  = 1; then ~di > ~
: The bank
faces all N potential projects when it deviates from  = 1, while it faces N=B if all banks
post  = 1. The total funding Di can now be used to support
h
1 G(~di )
i
N number of
projects, that is x
h
1 G(~di )
i
N = Di; while before the deviation Di can be used to supporth
1 G(~)
i
N=B number of projects, that is x
h
1 G(~)
i
N=B = Di: Since B  2; we have
~di >
~: Therefore, the average success probability of the invested projects is higher. Using
the same funding Di; now the bank i can invest in a larger number of projects with a higher
average probability of success, the bank i would deviate from posting i = 1. As a result, it
is not an equilibrium if all the banks post  = 1. If there is a symmetric equilibrium with
bank competition, then i < 1:
Denition 1 A symmetric equilibrium with bank competition is dened by sequences of
quantities
n
fni;t; Si;t; Ki;t; Di;tgBi=1 ; mt; yt; cyt ; cot
o1
t=1
, prices fct ; rct ; qt; wtg1t=1 ; an ini-
tial value of intermediate good m0, an initial value of bank capital a0; and a policy parameter
k such that: (1) the representative young household maximizes its expected life-time utility
subject to (3.1), taking as given the wage rate, the interest rates, and the expected prot
from entrepreneurs; (2) the representative old household consumes everything it gets from
its income; (3) taking as given the market deposit rate, the strategy of entrepreneurs and
the strategy of other banks, the capital requirement rate k, and the expected price of the in-
termediate good q^t+1, the banks choose their capital Ki;t; raise deposit Si;t from the young
households, post a prot division rule ct and a project selection rule (i.e. a threshold value
of project quality ~i;t) to maximize the expected value (3.5); (4) an entrepreneur chooses a
strategy on which islands to attend to maximize its expected prot; (5) the total canned good
is produced according to yt = ztf(mt 1); (6) all the markets clear; (7) all the prices and
quantities are identical across islands; and (8) no banks deviate from the equilibrium.
The markets clearing conditions are apparent in the labor market, the intermediate good
market, and the credit market. In the canned good market, it should be
cy1 + c
o
1 + S1 + s1 + cb;1 +K1 = y1 + b1 + a0; where y1 = z1f(m0);
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and
cyt + c
o
t + St + st + cb;t +Kt + bt 1 = yt + vt 1 + st 1 + bt; for t = 2; 3; 4; ::::
We assume that the initial intermediate goodm0 is owned by the old households. The banks
initial capital a0 is large enough that the bank does not need to borrow in order to satisfy
the capital requirement in the rst period, that is b1 = 0 and a0 > K1; more specically,
cb;1 +K1 = a0: The demand for the canned good consists of the total consumption by the
young households, cyt ; the total consumption by the old households, c
o
t ; the deposit and
storage of the young households, St and st; the total consumption by the banks, cb;t; the
total bank capital, Kt; and the debt repayment, bt 1. The supply of the canned good
consists of the total output yt; the total new debt of the banks from outside, bt; the storage
from last period, st 1; and the canned good at the banks that have not been lent out,
vt 1 = Dt 1   t 1: All the variables in the above market clearing condition are aggregate
variables, for example, bt =
R
bi;tdi and vt 1 =
R
Di;t 1di  
R
i;t 1di: In the equilibrium
vt 1 = 0 according to lemma 1.
In a symmetric equilibrium, we have ni = N=B; ^
c
i = x= (q^
c) and nix
h
1 G

~ci
i
=
Di: Without confusion we have dropped the subscript for t and q^ is the expected price of
intermediate goods in the next period: If a symmetric competitive equilibriumwith c 2 (0; 1)
exists, we have to ensure that no banks deviate from it. We prove that such a symmetric
equilibrium exists and it is unique under certain conditions. This is the most important
result in this paper and it is summarized in proposition 1. The proof is provided in the
appendix.
Proposition 1 There exists a symmetric equilibrium with bank competition. This symmetric
equilibrium is unique if the distribution of  satises that the term
R 
~
dG()
~[1 G(~)] weakly decreases
in ~.
We have shown that  < 1 in the equilibrium with bank competition. Consequently,
some projects that could be protable if  = 1 are not worth investing from the banks
perspective. To maximize prot, the banks have already made the best use of equity and
19
debt. The banks do not want to use more equity, because it is expensive, i.e., the marginal
cost of equity  is high. Given the bank equity, it has already used up the maximum amount
of deposit it can get according to the capital requirement. In the equilibrium, the banks
cannot get funds from the traditional equity and debt to nance the projects being rationed.
The coexistence of potential protable projects and shortage of funding may motivate the
banks to innovate "out of balance sheet" activities.
Of course, securitization is not just about raising more funds, it is also about how to raise
more funds (design securities and their prices, e.g. DeMarzo and Du¢ e, 1999, and Rahi and
Du¢ e, 1995), which is not the focus of the current model. It is true and important that
through securitization banks can sell illiquid assets to raise funds, repackaging the assets of
di¤erent levels of risk to t the tranches of securities to the nal investorss taste for risks.
This whole process of securitization increases the supply for funding. But if there arent any
potentially protable projects available, banks have no need to raise more "out of balance
sheet" funds. Our focus is the creation of demand for funding via the competition among
banks. By making some potentially protable projects rationed, bank competition could be
a trigger for securitization.
Let us add some remarks on the bank capital and capacity-constrained Bertrand equi-
librium. In an environment of bank competition, capital requirement reduces the potential
benet from deviating the symmetric equilibrium. This is because the deposit at a bank is
restricted by the capital requirement rate. With restricted size of deposit, the benet from
attracting additional projects is limited. So capital requirement has the e¤ect of prevent-
ing excess bank competition, thus causing banks to earn positive prot in the equilibrium.
Without this restriction, the equilibrium will be a Bertrand equilibrium with all the banks
earning zero prot.
5 Symmetric equilibrium with securitization
In this paper, securitization is dened as pooling contractual debts that have di¤erent risk
levels and selling them to households. To be consistent with the above model environment,
we let securitization be the fourth stage of banksdecisions, after the banks post their loan
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contract in the third stage. Suppose a bank i is allowed to sell up to 1   proportion of its
investment in projects to households; the bank could raise additional funds to nance the
projects rationed in the third stage.
Recall that the information about the types of entrepreneurs is revealed after they visit
one island. This information is common knowledge to both the bank and the entrepreneurs
in the island, but the information is unknown to other banks. Implicitly, other banks will
need to evaluate the projects in which they can invest, although not in the same time period.
Under this assumption, the entrepreneurs do not move after their types have been revealed,
because they cannot get funded by other banks in the same period. If the banks can raise
funds and invest in the rationed projects, the banks can take the whole prot from them
since the entrepreneurs do not have outside options. This assumption simplies the analysis,
but the general result should not be a¤ected.
To solve the problem in the securitization stage, we rst nd the threshold value of
; above which the projects are going to be nanced, ~ai : The value of ~
a
i depends on the
protability of projects and the availability of securities. We denote ^ai as the threshold value
of , above which projects are protable, then ^ai should satisfy xr
ai = q^^
a
i : Let ~
a
i be the
threshold value of  that satises
xni
h
G(~i) G

~ai
i
= (1  ) i; (5.1)
where ~i is the project quality above which projects were nanced in the third stage. Recall
that i = min
n
nix
h
1 G(^i)
i
; Di
o
is the total lending that had gone to the investments
in the third stage. So (1  ) i is the maximum quantity of assets that could be securitized
and sold by bank i. Then, ~ai = max
n
^ai ;
~ai
o
:
The projects with quality between ~i and ~
a
i are not nanced before the banks sell their
assets. Bank competition causes ~i to be higher than ~

i ; the later being the threshold quality
in the one bank equilibrium. In the equilibrium with securitization, ~ai might be higher or
lower than ~i : If the constraint (5.1) is not binding, however, it is for sure that ~
a
i <
~i : This
is because the bank can get enough funds to support all the projects that are protable, i.e.,
the revenue from the project covers the cost of the project. Moreover, raising money through
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securities is less costly than doing it through deposit, since there is no capital requirement
on securitization. Of course, this might not be true if there are other costs associated with
securitization. On the other hand, if the constraint (5.1) is binding, then ~ai might be higher
than ~i ; due to insu¢ cient funding.
The demand for funding from new projects is xni
h
G(~i) G

~ai
i
, which weakly de-
creases in ra through ~ai : The supply of funding from the sale of securities is denoted by
Sai

ra; 

; where ra is the interest rate for securities and  is the market success probability
of securities. The supply of funding is eventually the households spending on securities,
which strictly increases in ra: Given rc; ~i; ; and i determined in the third stage, there
exists an ra such that the demand of funding equals the supply of funding in the fourth
stage,
xni
h
G(~i) G

~ai
i
= Sai

ra; 

: (5.2)
Through securitization the economy can extend the number of nanced projects from
N
h
1 G(~i)
i
to N
h
1 G(~ai )
i
: As a result, the economy is going to have a higher level of
the intermediate good, m0 =aiNp
a
i ; where 
a
i =
R 
~a
i
dG()
1 G(~ai )
and pai = 1   G(~ai ): Recall that
q^ = z^ f 0(m0) and w = y   z^ f 0(m0)m0; so the expected price of the intermediate good q^ will
decrease, while the total output y and wage rate w will increase.
In the fourth stage, the banks problem is to maximize the total prot subject to a "skin
in the game" constraint
xni
h
G(~i) G

~ai
i
 (1  ) i: (5.3)
Knowing the problem the bank is going to face in the fourth stage, it chooses a pair of (i,
~i) in the third stage to maximize the total prot, including the prot in both the third and
the fourth stages.
In the third stage, the indi¤erence curve over

i;
~i

for the entrepreneurs is still the
same as in the case of no securitization, since we have assumed that the banks get all the
prots in the securitization stage so that the entrepreneurs only need to consider their prots
in the third stage. However, the banks may post a i higher or lower than in the case of
no securitization, since i a¤ects not only the banks prot in the third stage, but also the
banks prot in the fourth stage. Given the interest rate rc; the expected interest rate ra;
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the total funding Di, the indi¤erence curve of the entrepreneurs, and the strategy of other
banks, the bank i chooses a pair of (i; ~i) to maximize the following prot from the third
and the fourth stages:
b;i = max
i
ni
c
ei=(1  i)  Di + niq^
Z ~i
~ai
dG() iraSai

ra; 

: (5.4)
Here, ni = Dix[1 G(~i)]
; and ~i = ~i; since the banks still have no need to raise more funding
than necessary.
However, it is possible that x > q^i^i; i.e., the bank may invest in some projects
with negative expected return in the third stage. The purpose of investing in these "non-
protable" projects is that the banks can sell their loans through securitization. The funds
raised through securitization can be used to invest in new projects to earn more prot, which
may cover the loss incurred by the projects with x > q^ii:
The possibility of investing in "non-protable" projects highlights the banksmotive for
reselling their loans: they have good originating opportunity. This originating opportunity
is caused by excess competition across banks: a low i increases the lending standard and
cuts o¤ funding for some good projects. The banks put themselves in a di¢ cult situation:
if a bank increases its i, it loses a pool of potential projects to its competitors; if the bank
keeps a low i; then only some very good projects can give the bank enough return to cover
the cost of funding and many good projects cannot be nanced. The banks may choose to
post a relatively low i to attract the potential projects to them, and then get additional
funding from selling their loans to nance the projects that could not get nanced in the
rst run.
Potentially, there is another interesting angle of investing in non-protable projects. If
the nal investors are unaware of a high risk of getting negative return when they buy
securities backed by these projects with negative expected return, the banks can gain infor-
mation premium from securitization by charging a higher than "should-be" price from the
unsuspecting nal investors. In that case, the banks may have an additional incentive for
securitization: to get an excess premium from asymmetric information. However, we do not
explore this information rent in the current paper; rather we try to clarify the framework of
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bank competition and securitization in a simple way. Of course, extensions could be made
to handle the design and pricing of securities in a general equilibrium framework with bank
competition.
However, even in this simple framework, the bank i may have an incentive to lower its
paying rate of securities i, taking as given the market success probability of securities, .
The bank i will not consider the externality it imposes on the market when it increases its
i: When i increases,i decreases, and the bank pays the securitiesir
aSai (r
a; ):
Whether we have some "non-protable" projects being invested or not depends on whether
the "skin in the game" constraint (5.3) is binding. If the constraint is binding, i.e.,
xni
h
G(~i) G

~ai
i
= (1  ) i;
then the bank may invest in some projects that have negative expected return, i.e. x >
q^i^i: Since a binding "skin in the game" constraint makes selling additional assets valuable,
the banks have an incentive to increase the volume of their loans. On the other hand, if the
bank expects that the constraint (5.3) will not be binding, then it has no need to invest in
"non-protable" projects, and in that case x = q^i^i.
Depending on whether the constraint (5.3) is binding, we have two possible cases. In
the rst case, if the constraint (5.3) is binding, then not all projects with  > ^ai = xr
ai=q^
are invested, so ~ai = ~
a
i ; where ~
a
i is determined by xni
h
G(~i) G

~ai
i
= (1  ) i from
(5.1). In the second case, if the constraint (5.3) is not binding, then ~ai = ^
a
i and xr
ai = q^^
a
i :
We rst consider the case in which the constraint (5.3) is binding. The binding case is
more general in the real world. The reasons could be that the technique of securitization is
restricted, or that the cost of securitization is high. In this case, the binding "skin in the
game" constraint gives
G(~i) G

~ai

= (1  )
h
1 G(~i)
i
: (5.5)
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We di¤erentiate completely the equation (5.5) to get
d~ai
d~i
=
(2  ) g(~i)
g(~ai )
: (5.6)
The term d
~ai
d~i
> 0 in (5.6), indicating that if ~i increases, then ~
a
i increases. It means that a
higher quality of assets (a smaller volume of assets) in the third stage would cause a lower
amount of securities in the fourth stage, due to the binding "skin in the game" constraint.
In the rst case, a banks problem is to choose a i to maximize the total prot, both
from the investment in the third stage and from the investment in the fourth stage,
b;i = max
i
ni
c
ei= (1  i)  Di + niq^
Z ~i
~ai
dG() iraSai (ra; ); (5.7)
where ni = Dix[1 G(~i)]
:We can show that there is a unique symmetric Nash equilibrium given
some conditions. This result is summarized in proposition 2 and the proof is provided in the
appendix.
Proposition 2 In the case where the constraint (5.3) is binding, if the distribution of 
and  satisfy the condition g

~ai

=g

~i

 (2  ) = (1  ) for any 0 < ~ai  ~i with
1 G

~ai

= (2  )
h
1 G(~i)
i
; there exists a unique value of i that maximizes the prot
of the bank i:
Note that in proposition 2 the conditions for the unique symmetric equilibrium are suf-
cient conditions.
In the case where the "skin in the game" constraint (5.3) is not binding, an equilibrium
does not exist. We will show that in lemma 2 and the proof is provided in the appendix.
Lemma 2 If the constraint (5.3) is not binding, there is no stationary symmetric equilib-
rium.
As we show in the appendix, the banks will always have an incentive to lower i to attract
more potential projects, if the constraint (5.3) is not binding. This process will lead us to
go back to the rst case where i is low enough and the constraint (5.3) is binding.
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6 Example
In this example we solve a symmetric equilibrium with a uniform distribution of ; i.e.,
G () = (   ) =     . With a uniform distribution of ; the term R ~ dG()~[1 G(~)] decreases in
~ according to proposition 2, so there is a unique symmetric equilibrium in the case of no
securitization. For any 0 < ~ai  ~i with 1   G

~ai

= (2  )
h
1 G(~i)
i
; it is also true
that the condition g

~ai

=g

~i

 (2  ) = (1  ) is satised. According to proposition
3, we have a unique symmetric equilibrium with securitization.
6.1 Equilibrium without securitization
We rst derive the entrepreneurs indi¤erence curve. Given the total funding Di; the thresh-
old value of  above which the projects can be nanced is
~i =   
 
   Di= (nix) : (6.1)
Without securitization, ^i = ~i according to lemma 1: So we can have
rc =
h
q^i~i=x  (1  k) 
i
=k: (6.2)
Using (6.1); the entrepreneurs expected prot becomes
ce = q^(1  i)

2Di= (nix) 
 
    (Di= (nix))2 =2: (6.3)
Equation (6.3) gives an indi¤erence curve over the choices of (i; ni) for an entrepreneur.
We express i in terms of ni;
i = 1 
2ce
q^

2Di= (nix) 
 
    (Di= (nix))2 : (6.4)
Taking as given the indi¤erence curve of the entrepreneurs (6.3) and their expected prot
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ce, the expected prot of a bank is
b;i (ni) = ni
c
ei= (1  i)  Di:
Here we have made ni the choice variable, instead of i, just for convenience. We substitute
i from (6.4) into the above prot function to get
b;i (ni) = ni

q^

Di= (nix) 
 
    (Di= (nix))2 =2  ce	  Di: (6.5)
The rst order condition is
 (ni) = q^
 
    [Di= (nix)]2 =2  ce = 0: (6.6)
We can solve for nci ,
nci =
q
q^
 
    = (2ce)Di=x: (6.7)
In the symmetric equilibrium, we should have nci = N=B: Using (6.7) we can solve for 
c
e;
ce = q^
 
    [BDi= (Nx)]2 =2: (6.8)
Using (6.8) and (6.4), we can solve for i given the amount of funding Di;
i = 1 
 
     BDi
Nx

2         BDi
Nx
 : (6.9)
We have solved the problem of banks as credit suppliers and the entrepreneursproblem.
Given the total projects being invested, the quantity of the intermediate goods ism =iNpi:
The corresponding wage rate and the price of the intermediate good are
w = (1  ) z^

iNpi

(6.10)
and
q^ = z^

iNpi
 1
: (6.11)
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Next, we are going to solve the problem of banks as credit demanders and the problem of
households.
The representative young household takes the value of w; q^; and rc as given. If rc < 1;
then the representative young household does not deposit. Instead, it stores its canned good
to save. Its choice is
 u0 (w   s) + Eu0 (s) = 0 and Si = 0 for all i = 1; 2; :::; B: (6.12)
If rc  1; then the representative young household will deposit the canned goods at banks.
The solution comes from the following rst order conditions:
 u0
 
w  
BX
i=1
Si   s
!
+ rcEu0
 
rc
BX
i=1
Si + s+ ~
c
e
!
 0; if 0  Si  Shi ; (6.13)
where Shi is the limit of deposit contract that bank i could provide since the bank i is
restricted by the bank capital Ki through Ki=
 
Ki + S
h
i

= k. In the symmetric equilibrium,
if rc > 1; then s = 0; Si = Shi and
u0 (w  BSi) = rcEu0 (rcBSi + ~ce) ; (6.14)
if rc = 1; then s  0; Si  0 and
u0 (w  BSi   s) = Eu0 (BSi + s+ ~ce) : (6.15)
The equations (6.14) and (6.15) give the deposit supply function Si(rc).
In the equilibrium, we should have the total funding supply equals the total funding
demand, that is
xNpi = BSi(r
c)=(1  k): (6.16)
When rc = 1; we assume that the household deposits as much as the banks would need,
which will be Si = xNpi(1  k)=B; and stores the rest:
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In a steady state, we can solve equations (6.2), (6.8), (6.9), (6.10), (6.11), (6.14) and
(6.16) to get the equilibrium q^; w; rc; Si, i; ~
c
e; and ~i:
6.2 Equilibrium with securitization
With securitization, an entrepreneurs expected prot is still (6.3), since it does not get any
prot in the securitization stage. Since a unique symmetric equilibrium exists only in the
case where the "skin in the game" constraint is binding according to lemma 2, the following
relationship between ~ai and ~i should hold,
~ai = (2  ) ~i   (1  ) : (6.17)
So, d
~ai
d~i
= (2  ), which means that a 1% decrease in ~i relaxes ~ai by (2  )%: Recall that
equilibrium symmetry and lemma 1 imply that N=B = Di
x[1 G(~i)] ; so
~i =   
 
   BDi=(xN): (6.18)
According to (6.17) and (6.18)
~ai =
   (2  )     BDi=(xN): (6.19)
The rst order derivative of the banks prot has the same sign as (i): Using (6.17)
and (6.18) , and (i) dened in (A.6), we have
(i) = (1  i)

2BDi=(xN) 
 
    [BDi=(xN)]2 =2
  (2  )2   (1  )xra=q^      [BDi=(xN)]2 =2:
So the rst order condition is equivalent to (ai ) = 0, which gives
ai = 1 

(2  )2   (1  )xra=q^     BDi=(xN)
2       BDi=(xN) : (6.20)
Using a uniform distribution of ; we can analytically show some properties of the equi-
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librium with securitization. One important result is summarized in Lemma 3.
Lemma 3 If  < 1; there is securitization in the equilibrium. The lending rate is lower
compared to an economy without securitization, i.e. ai < i; given the same size of deposit
Si; with a uniform distribution of :
The proof of Lemma 3 is apparent by comparing (6.20) to (6.9). Dene
' =

(2  )2   (1  )xra=q^ ;
all we need to show is that ' > 1 for all  < 1: Recall that ra = q^^ai =

xi

; so xra=q^ =
^ai =
i < 1: As a result, ' > (2  )2   (1  ) > 1:
A lower lending rate in the equilibrium with securitization comes from the fact that
the banks have more incentive to compete for potential projects if they have access to
securitization. Moreover, the smaller the value of  (the looser the "skin in the game"
constraint); the smaller the value of ai , indicating a more intensive competition among
banks.
Since the "skin in the game" constraint is binding, it is possible that ^ai < ~
a
i ; i.e. not
all the projects can get funding even if they could make prot. So we have ~ai = ~
a
i  ^ai :
It is di¢ cult to determine whether ^i > ~i or ^i  ~i. It is possible that ^i > ~i; i.e., some
projects invested in the third stage make negative prot. The banks may have incentive to
invest in these projects with negative prot, because they can relax the "skin in the game"
constraint such that they can invest in more projects by selling more loans. The negative
prot should be compensated by the prot from increased investment in the fourth stage.
Moreover, if a project is invested in the third stage, the bank gets a share of ai ; if the project
is invested in the fourth stage, the bank gets a share of 1: The loss from this change should
also be compensated by the additional prots from additional investment due a relax of the
"skin in the game" constraint.
The total amount of intermediate goods is m = aiNp
a
i ; where 
a
i =
R 
~a
i
dG()
1 G(~ai )
and pai =
1 G(~ai ): The wage rate and the price of the intermediate good are
w = (1  ) z^

aiNp
a
i

(6.21)
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and
q^ = z^

aiNp
a
i
 1
: (6.22)
We focus on the equilibrium with rc  1 (ra  rc). If rc < 1 the household is going to
store all the canned goods and no intermediate goods will be produced. When rc = 1; we
assume that the representative household deposits as much as the banks would need and
stores the rest, so s  0. If rc > 1; then s = 0: The saving Si satises
u0 (w  BSi  BSai   s) (6.23)
= rcE
n
iu
0 (raBSai + r
cBSi + s+ ~
c
e) +

1  i

u0(rcBSi + s+ ~ce)
o
;
and the supply of securities Sai satises
u0 (w  BSi  BSai   s) = raE
h
iu
0 (raBSai + r
cBSi + s+ ~
c
e)
i
: (6.24)
Finally, we have the market clearing conditions. The total funding supply equals the
total funding demand, that is
BSi(r
c)=(1  k) =

1 G(~i)

Nx; (6.25)
and
BSai (r
a) = (G(~i) G(~ai ))Nx: (6.26)
The canned goods market clears,
w + rcS + raSa + ~ce +Bb + K = y: (6.27)
In a stationary symmetric equilibrium, we can solve equations (6.19) - (6.27) to get the
equilibrium q^; w; rc; ra; Si, Sai ; i, ~i and ~
a
i :
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6.3 Numerical example
In order to see the relationship between bank competition and securitization we do a numer-
ical exercise. For simplicity, we demonstrate a static model here. We use an isoelastic utility
function c
1 
1  and some plausible values of parameters:  = 0:4; x = 0:01; z^ = 1;
 = 1;
 = 0; B = 2; k = 0:08;  = 0:8;  = 0:9 and  = 1:25: The value of risk aversion parameter
has to be less than 1 in order to have the deposit supply function increases in interest rate,
we let  = 0:3: The value of N; the number of entrepreneurs, is a parameter that measures
the tightness of the loan market, which will vary when we do comparative statics.
6.3.1 Bank competitiveness
First, we need to nd an index to measure the competitiveness in the banking sector. The
setup of the model makes the equilibrium result independent of the number of banks, B; as
long as B  2 so that the banks will compete with each other. But the equilibrium does
vary with respect to the number of potential projects. Although the thickness of the loan
market, N=B; is not a good measure of bank competition given that the equilibrium is not
sensitive to B for B > 2, it is very important in the equilibrium. So we start with varying N
to nd a measure of bank competition. We will see that, in the example, when N increases,
 increases. This is intuitive. As the potential projects increase, the banks become less
aggressive to steal from others, yet get good projects.
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Figure 1.  and N
When N increases, there are two forces to increase the total investment. First, the
banks face less competition from each other and therefore their share of prot  increases.
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Second, the banks-invested projects will have a higher average quality. To separate the
second e¤ect of N from its role in decreasing banks competition, we dene the deviation of
total investment from a social planners world (or a world with only one bank) as a measure
of the imperfection of the banking industry. Specically, we dene a measure of banks
competitiveness, ; by
 =
investment (third stage) in bank competition equilibrium
investment in one bank equilibrium
:
We can see from gure 2 that  is also increasing in N .
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Figure 2.  and N
6.3.2 Optimal volume of securitization
We have assumed that  is an arbitrary policy parameter. Actually, there could be an
optimal level of securitization. We dene the optimal relative size of securitization by
 =
total volume of securities
total investment (third stage)
:
The following gure shows how the optimal share of securitization responds to market com-
petitiveness.
Figure 3.  and 
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7 Conclusion
We have built a dynamic general equilibrium model with bank competition. The framework
is a directed search model. Capital requirement imposes a short-run capacity constraint on
bankslending. Given the capacity constraint, the banks compete for projects using lending
rate. The model is a Bertrand competition with capacity-constraint as in Peters (1984) and
BSW (2001). We focus on a stationary symmetric mixed strategy equilibrium. We nd that
competition among could be among the causes for a low equilibrium lending rate and excess
demand for funding. As a consequence, banks may seek funds through the sale of their loans.
We show that securitization could be motivated by a purpose other than avoiding capital
requirement in a model devoid of asymmetric information.
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A Appendix
A.1 Proof of lemma 1.
Proof. In a symmetric equilibrium, knowing that the total loan is (i) given by (3.7), a
bank will not raise more funds than needed for its planed investment since additional funding
is costly. As a result,
Di = Si +Ki  ni (i)
h
1 G

^ (i)
i
x: (A.1)
Moreover, since bank equity is expensive, the bank will letKi and Si satisfy =Ki(Ki+Si) = k:
Notice that it will not be optimal if Di < ni (i)
h
1 G

^ (i)
i
x, because some protable
projects would not be nanced. The foresighted banks would increase bank equity Ki and
deposit Si in the rst step until Si +Ki = ni (i)
h
1 G

^ (i)
i
x:
A.2 Proof of Proposition 1.
Proof. Suppose there is a stationary symmetric equilibrium in which all the banks postn
c;~c
o
for every period, where c 2 (0; 1) : We need to show that no banks are willing to
post a di 6= c: So we focus on a strong Nash equilibrium.
In the third stage after Ki and Si are determined, if a bank i posts a contract (di ; ~
d
i )
and di < 
c; then the corresponding selection rule of the threshold value of project quality
~di should satisfy ~
d
i >
~ci : This is because a larger number of projects, n
d
i , will be attracted
by the new contract, ndi > n
c
i ; such that the bank can select better projects in a larger pool.
So the average quality of projects,di =
R 
~d
i
dG()
1 G(~di )
is also higher: The banks prot is
db;i = n
d
i p
d
i q^
di 
d
i   Di:
The probability of being nanced pdi = 1 G(~di ) is lower: Since the bank faces a better pool of
projects, it uses up all of its funding to nance the projects, so we have ndix
h
1 G(~di )
i
= Di:
When a bank varies its contract, it faces a trade-o¤ between the share of the expected
output from a project and the number of potential projects attracted, ndi . It is crucial to
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gure out how ndi moves in response to 
d
i : Observing 
d
i ; an entrepreneur will visit island i if
the expected prot from borrowing at island i is higher than or equal to what it could get from
other islands. If we consider an economy with a large number of banks and entrepreneurs,
the last visitor (marginal visitor) will have the same prot as if it visited any other islands,
that is
pdi q^(1  di )di = q^(1  di )
Z 
~di
dG() = ce: (A.2)
Equation (A.2) gives an indi¤erence curve over the choices of

di ;
~di

for an entrepreneur.
The expected prot of an entrepreneur in the initial symmetric equilibrium with c is
ce =
h
1 G(~ci)
i
q^(1  c)ci = q^(1  c)
Z 
~ci
dG():
Di¤erentiating equation (A.2) completely, we can get
d~di
ddi
=  
R 
~di
dG()
(1  di )~di g(~di )
: (A.3)
Given the indi¤erence curve of the entrepreneurs, the expected prot of the deviating
bank is
db;i
 
di

=
Di
x
h
1 G(~di )
i dice
(1  di )
  Di:
Here we have used ndi =
Di
x[1 G(~di )]
: Dene  (di ) 
@db;i(di )
@di
; we have
 (di ) =
h
1 G(~di )
i
  R ~di dG()di~dih
1 G(~di )
i2 1(1  di )2 
c
eDi
x
:
Here we have used (A.3) from the entrepreneursindi¤erence curve.
If  (di ) < 0; in the local area of the initial assumed equilibrium, there is a lower lending
rate di that can increase the prot of a bank: The condition for  (
d
i ) < 0 is equivalent to
1 <
R 
~di
dG()
~di
h
1 G(~di )
idi : (A.4)
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Since it is always true that
R 
~d
i
dG()
~di [1 G(~di )]
> 1; we should have limdi!1
R 
~d
i
dG()
~di [1 G(~di )]
di > 1: So (A.4)
is true for di ! 1: As a result, ci = 1 (or ci is large enough) cannot be an equilibrium.
As di ! 0; however, the opposite of (A.4) should be true. Moreover, the RHS of (A.4) is
increasing in di given the assumption that
R 
~d
i
dG()
~di [1 G(~di )]
is weakly decreasing in ~di : So there
exists a unique di such that  (
d
i ) = 0: This 
d
i is the unique stable symmetric equilibrium,
i.e., di = 
c:
A.3 Proof of Proposition 2.
Proof. Given the prot function of a bank i from (5.7);
b;i = max
i
Di
x
h
1 G(~i)
i ice
(1  i)
  Di + Di
x
h
1 G(~i)
i q^ Z ~i
~ai
dG() iraSai (ra; ):
As in the case without securitization, we have taken ce as given, because when the bank
varies i; it must change ~i such that the expected prot of an entrepreneur is una¤ected.
The rst order derivative of b;i with respect to i is
 (i) =
241  i
R 
~i
dG()
~i
h
1 G(~i)
i
35 Dice
x(1  i)2
1h
1 G(~i)
i (A.5)
 
241  (2  ) ~ai
~i
+
R ~i
~ai
dG()
~i
h
1 G(~i)
i
35 Dice
x(1  i)2
1h
1 G(~i)
i
+
24 1 + R ~i dG()
~i
h
1 G(~i)
i
35 raSai ce
q^(1  i)2
h
1 G(~i)
i :
The rst line in (A.5) is the same as in the case without securitization, which is the change
in the banks prot in the third stage; the second line in (A.5) is the decline in revenue in
the securitization stage; the third line in (A.5) is the decreased cost from the reduction in
the security paying rate.
Using d
~ai
d~i
from (5.6), the entrepreneurs trade-o¤ between i and ~i given by (A.3), and
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ce from (A.2), we have
 (i) =
24(2  ) ~ai   i
R 
~i
dG()h
1 G(~i)
i   R ~i~ai dG()h
1 G(~i)
i
35 Dice
x(1  i)2
1
~i
h
1 G(~i)
i
 
24~i   R ~i dG()h
1 G(~i)
i
35 xra (1  )
q^
Di
c
e
x(1  i)2
1
~i
h
1 G(~i)
i :
From the "skin in the game" constraint, the value of ~i and ~
a
i satisfy
1 G

~ai

= (2  )
h
1 G(~i)
i
;
so we have
 (i) =
24 ~ai h1 G~aii  i R ~i dG()  R ~i~ai dG()
 
h
~i
h
1 G(~i)
i
  R ~i dG()i xraq^ (1  )
35 Dice
x(1  i)2
1
~i
h
1 G(~i)
i2 ;
where ra =
q^^ai [1 G(~i)]
x
R 
~i
dG()
. We denote
(i) =
"
~ai
h
1 G

~ai
i
  i
Z 
~i
dG() 
Z ~i
~ai
dG()
#
(A.6)
 
"
~i
h
1 G(~i)
i
 
Z 
~i
dG()
#
xra
q^
(1  ) :
The sign of (i) determines the sign of  (i):We rst look at the sign of (i) when i ! 1;
lim
i!1
(i) =  
Z 
~ai

   ~ai

dG() +
"Z 
~i

   ~i

dG()
#
(1  )
^ai
h
1 G(~i)
i
R 
~i
dG()
:
Since
^ai [1 G(~i)]R 
~i
dG()
=
^ai
i
 1; (1  )  1; and ~ai  ~i; then
lim
i!1
(i) <  
Z 
~ai

   ~ai

dG() +
Z 
~i

   ~i

dG() < 0:
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Second, we look at the value of (i) as i ! 0: Since the sign of limi!0 (i) is the
same as the sign of limi!0
(i)
~ai [G(~i) G(~ai )]
; we can look at the sign of the latter,
lim
i!0
(i)
~ai
h
G(~i) G(~ai )
i
= lim
i!0
8<:
242  
1    
R ~i
~ai
dG()
~ai
h
G(~i) G(~ai )
i
35+
241  ~i
h
1 G(~i)
i
R 
~i
dG()
35 ^ai
~ai
9=;  0: (A.7)
The inequality in (A.7) holds since limi!0
R ~i
~a
i
dG()
~ai [G(~i) G(~ai )]
= 1 and

1  ~i[1 G(~i)]R 
~i
dG()

 0: Since
(i) is continuous, there exists a i such that (i) = 0: We have proved the existence of a
symmetric equilibrium.
Should the equilibrium be unique? A su¢ cient condition for uniqueness is that the
function (i) is monotonically decreasing in i: We have assumed that g

~ai

=g

~i


(2  ) = (1  ) for any ~ai and ~i that satisfy ~ai  ~i and
h
G(~i) G(~ai )
i
= (1 )
h
1 G(~i)
i
:
Given these assumptions, the sign of 0(i) is negative as shown below:
0(i) =
24 (2  ) g(~i) R ~i dG()
g(~ai )
~i
h
1 G

~ai
i + (1  ) ^ai
~i
35
h
1 G(~i)
i2
g(~i)(1  i)
< 0;
since
R 
~i
dG()
~i[1 G(~i)] > 1 and ^
a
i  ~ai  ~i. As a result, the solution of (i) = 0 is unique. We
have a unique symmetric equilibrium with the condition g

~ai

=g

~i

 (2  ) = (1  )
for any ~ai  ~i and 1 G

~ai

= (2  )
h
1 G(~i)
i
:
A.4 Proof of Lemma 2.
Proof. If the constraint (5.3) is not binding, the banks only invest in protable projects
in the third stage, since they do not need to worry about a shortage of assets to back their
securities. In this case, the marginal project breaks even, i.e., x = q^i^i. In the fourth stage,
the non-binding constraint (5.3) implies that all the protable projects will be nanced, that
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is, xrai = q^^
a
i ; wherei =
R 
^i
dG()
[1 G(^i)]
: We can therefore derive d^
a
i
d^i
;
d^ai
d^i
=
24 1 + R ^i dG()
^i
h
1 G(^i)
i
35 xra
q^
^ig(^i)h
1 G(^i)
i :
The banks maximization problem becomes:
b;i = max
i
ni
i
c
e
(1  i)
  Di + niq^
Z ^i
^ai
dG()  raiSai

ra; 

; (A.8)
where ni = Dix[1 G(^i)] : The rst order derivative of b;i with respect to i is
 (i) =
2664  i
R 
^i
dG()
^i[1 G(^i)]
 
R ^i
^a
i
dG()
^i[1 G(^i)]
+
^aiR 
^i
dG()
R 
^i
( ^i)dG()
^i[1 G(^i)]
h
^ai g(^
a
i ) +
Sai
Di
h
1 G

^i
ii
3775 q^Di
R 
^i
dG()
x(1  i)
h
1 G

^i
i :
Since the distribution of  is continuous, g(^ai ) = 0: Since the "skin in the game" constraint
is not binding, Sai < (1  )Di: So, we dene (i) by the terms in the brackets in  (i);
then
(i) <  i
R 
^i
dG()
^i
h
1 G

^i
i   R ^i^ai dG()
^i
h
1 G

^i
i + ^aiR 
^i
dG()
R 
^i

   ^i

dG()
^i
(1  )
<  i
R 
^i
dG()
^i
h
1 G

^i
i   ^ai

G(^i) G(^ai )

^i
h
1 G

^i
i + ^ai
^i
R 
^i

   ^i

dG()R 
^i
dG()
(1  )
<  i
R 
^i
dG()
^i
h
1 G

^i
i :
As a result,  (i) < 0 for all i > 0; so the bank is going to lower i until the constraint (5.3)
becomes binding. Then, we go back to the case with the binding constraint (5.3). There is
no equilibrium when the "skin in the game" constraint is not binding.
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